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1. The problem of naming and 
classifying Since	  the	  emergence	  of	  “CCs”	  thirty	  years	  ago,	  attempts	  to	  build	  typologies	  and	  to	  name	  things	  properly	  have	  always	  been	  disappointing,	  as	  if	  the	  very	  object	  of	  the	  analysis	  escaped	  from	  any	  rigid	  classi=ication.	  A	  major	  problem	  that	  arises	  with	  regards	  to	  CCs	  is	  the	  obsolescence	  of	  previous	  typologies,	  due	  to	  rapid	  innovation	  and	  the	  weakening	  of	  borders	  (technological,	  juridical,	  political,	  ideological…)	  that	  seemed	  unlikely	  to	  be	  broken	  down.1	  Even	  the	  terms	  “complementary	  currency”,	  “community	  currency”	  and	  many	  others	  (with	  language	  speci=icities	  in	  English	  as	  well	  as	  in	  other	  languages	  –	  for	  example,	  in	  Latin	  language-­‐speaking	  countries,	  something	  like	  “social	  money”	  is	  frequently	  employed)	  are	  not	  considered	  similarly	  by	  activists,	  scholars,	  policy-­‐makers	  or	  users.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  no	  common	  typology	  shared	  by	  scholars,	  activists	  and	  observers,	  beyond	  a	  series	  of	  general	  considerations	  clearly	  distinguishing	  speci=ic	  items	  between	  CC	  schemes.	  Whether	  this	  raises	  a	  major	  problem	  or	  not	  deserves	  re=lection,	  since	  the	  diversity	  and	  the	  innovation	  dynamics	  of	  CCs	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  
commonly	  shared	  typologies	  –	  on	  the	  contrary,	  they	  might	  be	  facilitated	  by	  it.	  One	  could	  add	  that	  building	  a	  typology	  requires	  =irst	  to	  state	  the	  precise	  objectives	  of	  it;	  different	  objectives	  may	  lead	  to	  different	  typologies	  (Blanc,	  2009).	  Under	  this	  respect,	  the	  English	  acronym	  “CC”,	  which	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  very	  title	  of	  this	  journal2,	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  quite	  suitable	  meta-­‐name,	  because	  it	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  hide	  and	  go	  beyond	  the	  con=lict	  between	  those	  who	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  “community	  currencies”	  and	  those	  who	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  “complementary	  currencies”.	  Unfortunately,	  we	  do	  not	  observe	  the	  same	  use	  of	  a	  meta-­‐name	  in	  other	  languages	  (at	  least	  in	  Spanish	  and	  in	  French),	  which	  would	  be	  able	  to	  transcend	  con=licts	  and	  almost	  gather,	  in	  a	  single	  term,	  very	  distinct,	  and	  evolving,	  schemes.	  The	  present	  short	  paper	  aims	  at	  proposing	  ways	  to	  build	  typologies	  in	  a	  =lexible	  framework,	  able	  to	  include	  further	  developments	  of	  the	  matter.	  Section	  2	  discusses	  the	  principles	  of	  a	  CC	  typology.	  Section	  3	  proposes	  a	  distinction	  between	  local,	  community,	  and	  complementary	  currencies,	  based	  on	  the	  schemes’	  projects.	  Section	  4	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  This	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  presents	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  attempt	  to	  classify	  and	  categorise	  CCs	  in	  a	  way	  which	  looks	  to	  future	  developments,	  while	  capturing	  the	  diversity	  of	  historical	  origins.	  The	  ideal	  types	  of	  community,	  complementary	  and	  local	  currencies	  let	  the	  possibility	  of	  combinations	  able	  to	  analyze	  concrete	  forms	  of	  non-­‐national	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐pro=it	  currencies.	  The	  teleological	  exclusion	  of	  sovereignty	  and,	  more	  important,	  pro=it	  motives	  must	  be	  emphasized.	  	  The	  present	  typology	  states	  that	  for-­‐pro=it	  currencies	  are	  of	  another	  nature	  than	  CCs,	  and	  it	  draws	  up	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  of	  CCs	  built	  around	  a	  democratic	  participation	  principle	  organized	  around	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  grassroots	  organizations	  or	  informal	  groupings	  of	  persons.
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distinguishes	  four	  generations	  of	  CC	  schemes,	  and	  section	  5	  concludes.	  
2. Principles of a typologyIn	  2006,	  the	  Workgroup	  on	  Solidarity	  Socio-­‐Economy	  supported	  by	  the	  Charles	  Léopold	  Mayer	  Foundation	  for	  the	  Progress	  of	  Humankind	  (FPH)	  set	  up	  a	  Social	  Money	  Workshop	  Facilitation	  Committee,	  whose	  coordination	  was	  assumed	  by	  Stephen	  DeMeleunaere.	  This	  committee	  attempted	  to	  explore	  “the	  Typology	  and	  Terminology	  used	  when	  discussing	  mechanisms”	  and	  intended	  to	  set	  “the	  outline	  of	  a	  common	  typology	  for	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  exchange	  systems”	  (DeMeleunaere	  and	  Blanc,	  2007).	  The	  general	  conclusions	  are	  worth	  repeating	  here,	  because	  they	  help	  understand	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  a	  general	  typology	  should	  be	  built.	  First,	  a	  typology	  of	  items	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  a	  typology	  of	  systems.	  While	  the	  =irst	  one	  consists	  in	  a	  list	  of	  a	  series	  of	  elementary	  items	  of	  every	  system	  allowing	  to	  identify	  variations	  (for	  example,	  choices	  with	  regards	  to	  currency	  issuance	  backing),	  the	  second	  one	  consists	  in	  combining	  elementary	  items,	  thus	  identifying	  relevant	  systems.	  The	  problem	  is	  then	  to	  build	  relevant	  sets	  of	  items	  making	  a	  system.	  Second,	  the	  Social	  Money	  Workshop	  Facilitation	  Committee	  report	  validated	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  general	  typology	  of	  money	  systems	  rather	  than	  a	  speci=ic	  typology	  of	  CCs.	  Under	  this	  viewpoint,	  CCs	  do	  not	  necessarily	  appear	  different	  in	  their	  nature	  from	  current	  money	  systems.	  They	  can	  be	  either	  similar	  in	  their	  nature	  (thus	  distinct	  in	  their	  extent	  or	  their	  scope),	  or	  different	  (if	  it	  can	  been	  shown	  that	  crucial	  distinctive	  features	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  their	  very	  nature).	  Third,	  a	  typology	  should	  not	  be	  built	  in	  order	  to	  classify	  observations	  –	  as	  a	  lepidopterist	  does;	  it	  should	  be	  =lexible	  enough	  to	  let	  space	  for	  innovation	  through	  the	  development	  of	  new	  systems.	  As	  a	  conclusion,	  a	  typology	  should	  be	  opened	  enough	  to	  let	  innovations	  develop:	  a	  given	  typology	  cannot	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  only	  relevant	  one,	  and	  it	  might	  be	  permanently	  discussed	  and	  transformed	  (DeMeleunaere	  and	  Blanc,	  2007).	  One	  possible	  conclusion	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  way	  of	  building	  a	  common	  typology,	  unless	  its	  purpose	  is	  made	  clearer.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  need	  of	  building	  relevant	  typologies	  in	  order	  to	  feature	  in	  a	  clever	  way	  the	  diversity	  of	  existing	  cases,	  replacing	  existing	  typologies	  by	  a	  single	  one	  
appears	  to	  be	  vain.	  Eventually,	  building	  a	  new	  one	  should	  not	  close	  the	  door	  to	  counter-­‐typologies,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  presented	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  one.	  The	  dif=iculty	  is	  surely	  not	  to	  be	  under-­‐estimated.	  For	  example,	  Kennedy	  and	  Lietaer’s	  discussion	  on	  typologies	  starts	  with	  a	  typology	  of	  CCs	  according	  to	  their	  purposes,	  but	  they	  fail	  to	  deepen	  it	  in	  a	  suf=icient	  way,	  and	  eventually	  discuss	  more	  thoroughly	  a	  series	  of	  elementary	  items:	  their	  form,	  their	  function,	  	  the	  way	  they	  are	  issued,	  the	  way	  their	  costs	  are	  covered	  (Kennedy	  and	  Lietaer,	  2004).	  The	  Social	  Money	  Workshop	  Facilitation	  Committee	  report	  itself	  failed	  to	  draw	  up	  “the	  outline	  of	  a	  common	  typology	  for	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  exchange	  systems”,	  by	  proposing	  only	  a	  series	  of	  re=lections	  with	  an	  account	  of	  a	  typology	  of	  items	  (DeMeleunaere	  and	  Blanc,	  2007).	  In	  a	  previous	  work,	  I	  tried	  to	  go	  beyond	  items	  by	  centring	  on	  CCs	  organizational	  choices	  (Blanc,	  2009).	  I	  de=ined	  a	  set	  of	  =ive	  coherent	  schemes	  according	  to	  the	  compatibility	  of	  their	  choices	  to	  their	  objectives.	  This	  attempt	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  de=inition	  of	  rigorous	  criteria	  for	  a	  typology.	  Other	  dif=iculty	  to	  be	  addressed,	  typologies	  too	  often	  consider	  CCs	  through	  =ish-­‐eye	  lenses,	  gathering	  every	  non-­‐national	  currency	  under	  the	  same	  banner.	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(Polanyi,	  1957).	  This	  conceptual	  toolbox	  is	  sometimes	  rede=ined	  in	  market,	  State	  and	  community.	  State	  may	  refer	  to	  every	  territorial	  level,	  from	  municipalities	  to	  national	  or	  federal	  levels.	  This	  gives	  criteria	  to	  analyze	  how	  the	  dominance	  of	  one	  of	  those	  principles	  and	  a	  set	  of	  hierarchical	  combinations	  between	  them	  shape	  monetary	  systems.	  Beside	  guiding	  principles	  and	  values,	  a	  monetary	  system	  is	  built	  in	  order	  to	  address	  general	  purposes.	  For	  example,	  the	  general	  philosophy	  of	  social	  reciprocity	  and	  the	  general	  purpose	  of	  inter-­‐generational	  solidarity	  lead	  to	  build	  time	  banks,	  wherein	  market	  prices	  and	  behaviours	  are	  let	  outside,	  by	  refusing	  any	  parity	  and	  convertibility	  between	  the	  internal	  currencies	  and	  the	  of=icial	  currency.	  Under	  this	  respect,	  this	  section	  proposes	  a	  distinction	  between	  three	  sorts	  of	  projects	  that	  constitute	  the	  very	  root	  of	  currency	  systems	  of	  any	  kind:	  a	  territorial	  project,	  primarily	  centred	  on	  a	  geopolitical	  space;	  a	  community	  project,	  primarily	  centred	  on	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  or	  an	  ad	  hoc	  community;	  an	  economic	  project,	  primarily	  centred	  on	  production	  and	  market	  exchange	  activities	  (Table	  1,	  below).	  This	  tripartite	  classi=ication	  of	  projects,	  however,	  does	  not	  take	  the	  nature	  of	  designers	  into	  account.	  In	  order	  to	  re=ine	  this	  typology,	  one	  should	  distinguish	  between	  three	  main	  sorts	  of	  designers	  and	  implementers.	  This	  third	  criterion	  has	  a	  great	  importance	  indeed,	  since	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  currency	  project’s	  background	  and	  make	  precise	  the	  way	  it	  can	  be	  orientated.	  Designers	  and	  implementers	  may	  be	  governments	  or	  the	  permanent	  organization	  of	  State	  services,	  pursuing	  a	  political	  motive;	  they	  may	  be	  capitalist	  =irms,	  pursuing	  a	  pro=it	  motive;	  and	  they	  may	  be	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  grassroots	  organizations	  or	  informal	  groupings	  of	  persons,	  pursuing	  a	  civil	  motive	  with	  democratic	  participation	  principles.	  This	  framework	  helps	  identify	  three	  ideal	  types	  of	  currency	  schemes:	  (1)	  local	  currencies	  (territorial	  projects),	  (2)	  community	  currencies	  (community	  projects)	  and	  (3)	  complementary	  currencies	  (economic	  projects).	  Nevertheless,	  two	  cases	  should	  de=initely	  be	  removed	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  CCs,	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  local	  currencies	  and	  complementary	  currencies.	  National	  currencies,	  that	  is	  money	  de=ined	  and	  organized	  by	  a	  national	  or	  federal	  sovereign	  power	  in	  a	  pure	  sovereignty	  framework,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  CCs.	  Currency	  schemes	  














 International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (2011) D 4-10                 7
pre-­‐existing,	  or,	  more	  surely,	  generated	  by	  the	  currency	  scheme	  itself.	  This	  includes	  social	  services	  and	  self-­‐help,	  as	  well	  as	  environmental	  services	  for	  a	  community.	  Reciprocity	  is	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  this	  ideal	  type.	  It	  is	  implemented	  by	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  and	  sometimes	  by	  informal	  groups.	  Communities	  are	  potentially	  independent	  from	  any	  territorial	  dimension,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  conceived	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  economic	  rationales.	  Those	  currencies	  can	  be	  coined	  community	  currencies.	  Close	  examples	  include	  time	  banking	  schemes.	  Currency	  schemes	  that	  primarily	  pursue	  an	  economic	  purpose	  constitute	  a	  third	  type.	  They	  are	  built	  with	  regards	  to	  economic	  spaces,	  de=ined	  by	  sets	  of	  actors	  and	  economic	  activities	  from	  production	  to	  exchange,	  mostly	  considered	  as	  ruled	  by	  market	  principles.	  Market	  exchange	  is	  thus	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  this	  currency	  type.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  they	  are	  implemented	  in	  a	  lucrative	  purpose,	  since	  they	  can	  be	  implemented	  by	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  which	  develop	  action	  toward	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  general	  interest.	  This	  emphasizes	  the	  particular	  purpose	  of	  in=luencing	  sets	  of	  economic	  activities:	  aiming	  at	  their	  protection	  (through	  a	  
form	  of	  protectionism	  allowed	  by	  the	  use	  of	  a	  convertibility	  rule	  that	  restraints	  out=lows),	  their	  stimulation	  (through	  the	  constraint	  of	  local	  use	  of	  the	  currency),	  their	  (re-­‐)orientation	  (through	  speci=ic	  rules	  stimulating,	  for	  example,	  environmentally	  oriented	  practices).	  This	  type	  can	  be	  thought	  completely	  outside	  territory	  issues	  and	  community	  issues.	  Those	  currencies	  can	  be	  coined	  complementary	  currencies.	  Close	  examples	  include	  German	  regio	  schemes.
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generation	  may	  be	  regenerated	  by	  innovation	  (Table	  2).	  Each	  generation	  includes	  a	  series	  of	  experiences	  often	  related	  to	  each	  others,	  while	  each	  generation	  entertains	  links	  with	  experiences	  from	  previous	  ones	  and	  provides	  models,	  positive	  or	  negative,	  for	  future	  ones.	  A	  =irst	  generation	  of	  CC	  schemes	  appeared	  with	  the	  LETS	  model	  in	  the	  1980s.	  It	  has	  been	  very	  dynamic	  up	  to	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1990s.	  Big	  (national)	  networks	  emerged,	  some	  being	  structured	  around	  a	  speci=ic	  organization	  (Lets	  Link	  UK	  in	  the	  UK,	  Selidaire	  in	  France…).	  The	  model	  was	  exported	  from	  country	  to	  country	  by	  activists,	  but	  grassroots	  innovation	  played	  their	  role	  in	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  model	  and	  differentiation	  within	  it.	  They	  are	  mainly	  “mutual	  credit”	  systems	  (money	  is	  created	  in	  the	  very	  time	  of	  exchange).	  However,	  paper	  currencies	  were	  also	  implemented,	  either	  during	  clearly	  de=ined	  and	  regulated	  short	  periods	  of	  exchange	  (e.g.	  SEL),	  or	  as	  the	  very	  principle	  of	  this	  currency,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  trueque	  (money	  is	  issued	  before	  exchange	  and	  as	  a	  precondition	  of	  it).	  
While	  time	  is	  frequently	  considered	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  exchange	  value,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  and	  it	  sometimes	  totally	  disappears.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  currency	  inconvertibility	  (though	  fraud	  is	  possible	  with	  paper	  currencies).	  This	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  co-­‐use	  of	  currencies	  (transactions	  paid	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  internal	  and	  national	  currencies),	  especially	  when	  existing	  formal	  small	  enterprises	  or	  shops	  are	  included	  in	  the	  scheme.	  However,	  those	  schemes	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  weakness	  of	  partnerships	  or	  even	  relationships	  with	  such	  formal	  economic	  activities,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  local	  governments.	  They	  mostly	  refer	  to	  community	  currencies	  established	  by	  local	  non-­‐pro=it	  organisations	  that	  aim	  at	  providing	  the	  means	  (reciprocity)	  to	  satisfy	  needs	  that	  are	  unmet	  by	  market	  activities	  or	  public	  services.	  In	  some	  cases,	  however,	  there	  has	  been	  some	  place	  for	  market	  exchange	  or,	  at	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  for	  public	  partnerships	  and	  logics.	  Observations	  on	  














“We propose a second level of typology, 
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 International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (2011) D 4-10                 9
aiming	  at	  protecting	  or	  stimulating	  their	  territory,	  they	  would	  be	  local	  currencies).	  A	  =ixed	  rate	  links	  the	  complementary	  currency	  to	  the	  national	  one,	  and	  convertibility	  rules	  are	  settled.	  Currency	  issues	  are	  backed	  by	  national	  currency	  reserves,	  contrary	  to	  the	  =irst	  and	  second	  generations	  schemes	  where	  no	  backing	  is	  required	  because	  of	  the	  inconvertibility	  principle.	  In=lows	  (ie	  conversion	  from	  national	  currency	  to	  complementary	  currency)	  are	  possible,	  and	  even	  promoted	  through	  a	  bonus	  rate,	  whereas	  out=lows	  are	  formally	  impossible	  (Ithaca	  Hour)	  or	  deterred	  by	  conversion	  costs	  (Regio).	  Complementary	  currencies	  of	  this	  generation	  are	  useable	  in	  the	  current	  economic	  sphere,	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  co-­‐use	  with	  national	  currencies.	  They	  aim	  at	  dynamizing	  local	  economic	  activity	  by	  re-­‐localizing	  a	  series	  of	  daily	  consumption	  expenses.	  The	  success	  of	  those	  schemes	  requires	  thus	  the	  inclusion	  of	  small	  local	  enterprises	  and	  shops,	  and	  sometimes	  bigger	  ones.	  Partnerships	  with	  local	  governments	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this	  success,	  especially	  when	  local	  taxes	  can	  be	  paid	  with	  complementary	  currency	  or	  when	  local	  public	  services	  can	  be	  accessed	  with	  it.	  	  Rotterdam’s	  NU	  scheme	  in	  2002-­‐03	  has	  been	  a	  forerunner	  of	  a	  fourth	  generation	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  progressively	  emerging.	  Schemes	  of	  this	  new	  generation	  are	  constituted	  by	  multiplex	  projects	  where	  local	  governments	  play	  a	  major	  role.	  They	  combine	  several	  objectives	  that	  were	  kept	  separate	  up	  to	  then,	  and	  they	  focus	  on	  
environmental	  issues	  more	  than	  never	  before.	  Multiplexity	  leads	  to	  costly	  projects	  that	  are	  dif=icult	  to	  engineer	  and	  that	  require	  a	  complex	  governance.	  Local	  governments,	  enterprises	  (from	  small	  ones	  to	  major	  =irms),	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  national	  programmes	  and,	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  European	  programmes,	  have	  to	  be	  gathered	  around	  those	  projects.	  An	  experimentation	  phase	  appears	  to	  be	  necessary	  before	  launching	  the	  project	  on	  a	  larger	  scale.	  The	  NU	  project	  aimed	  at	  inciting	  sustainable	  behaviours	  through	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  complementary	  currency	  in	  relation	  with	  those	  behaviours:	  local	  or	  organic	  product	  consumption,	  fair	  trade,	  waste	  recycling...	  The	  French	  SOL	  programme,	  implemented	  since	  2007,	  is	  another	  case	  of	  fourth	  generation	  scheme	  whose	  architecture	  is	  notably	  complex.	  It	  combines	  a	  loyalty	  card	  for	  sustainable	  consumption	  close	  to	  commercial	  loyalty	  schemes,	  a	  rewarding	  scheme	  for	  voluntary	  action	  close	  to	  the	  =irst	  and	  second	  generations	  of	  CC	  schemes,	  and	  a	  redistribution	  scheme.	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teleological	  exclusion	  of	  sovereignty	  and,	  more	  important,	  pro=it	  motives	  must	  be	  emphasized.	  It	  is	  frequent,	  indeed,	  to	  consider	  for-­‐pro=it	  currencies	  along	  with	  CC	  schemes,	  stating	  that	  they	  all	  refer	  to	  non-­‐national	  currencies	  and,	  thus,	  that	  they	  are	  all	  “complementary”.	  The	  present	  typology	  states	  that	  for-­‐pro=it	  currencies	  are	  of	  another	  nature	  than	  CCs,	  and	  it	  draws	  up	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  of	  CCs	  built	  around	  a	  democratic	  participation	  principle	  organized	  around	  non-­‐pro=it	  organizations,	  grassroots	  organizations	  or	  informal	  groupings	  of	  persons.	  Identifying	  CC	  generations	  avoids	  any	  closed	  typology	  and	  leads	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  actual	  dynamics	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  never	  stopped	  since	  then,	  although	  their	  extent,	  their	  forms	  and,	  overall,	  their	  projects,	  evolved	  rapidly.	  New	  generations	  should	  emerge	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  and	  decades,	  either	  through	  the	  spreading	  of	  already	  existing	  schemes	  like	  Strohalm’s	  C3,	  or	  through	  new	  combination	  of	  existing	  schemes	  or	  of	  basic	  items,	  or	  eventually	  through	  critical	  innovations	  like	  the	  “free	  currencies”	  attempts.	  The	  future	  evolution	  of	  CCs	  is	  certainly	  linked	  to	  technological	  progress	  (with	  the	  use	  of	  internet	  and	  mobile	  devices),	  to	  their	  acknowledgment	  as	  a	  key	  element	  of	  public	  policies,	  and	  to	  their	  use	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  environmental	  solutions.	  
Endnotes
1	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  for	  example,	  the	  Internet	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  community	  schemes	  whose	  actual	  limits	  are	  totally	  disconnected	  with	  national	  borders.	  Other	  example,	  while	  in	  France	  the	  =irst	  attempts	  in	  the	  1990s	  were	  built	  in	  the	  fear	  of	  illegality	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  ordinance	  of	  the	  end	  of	  1950s,	  this	  fear	  seems	  to	  have	  disappeared	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  2000s	  with	  the	  spreading	  of	  several	  paper	  currencies	  projects	  and	  programme2	  Symptomatic	  of	  this	  dif=iculty	  (if	  not	  con=lict),	  the	  original	  title	  of	  the	  journal	  refers	  to	  “community”	  whereas	  the	  Call	  for	  papers	  for	  a	  special	  edition,	  2010,	  deals	  with	  “Current	  Developments	  in	  Complementary	  Currencies”.
ReferencesBlanc	  Jérôme	  (2009),	  "Contraintes	  et	  choix	  organisationnels	  dans	  les	  dispositifs	  de	  monnaies	  sociales",	  Annals	  of	  Public	  and	  Cooperative	  Economics,	  80(4),	  pp.	  547-­‐577.	  DeMeleunaere	  Stephen	  and	  Blanc	  Jérôme,	  “Systems	  –	  Mechanisms”,	  in	  :	  DeMeulenaere	  Stephen	  (Coord.),	  (2007),	  Social	  Money	  Workshop.	  Facilitation	  Committee	  Report,	  2006-­‐2007,	  Fondation	  pour	  le	  Progrès	  de	  l’homme,	  Paris.Kennedy	  Margrit	  and	  Lietaer	  Bernard	  (2004),	  Regionalwährungen.	  Neue	  Wege	  zu	  nachhaltigem	  Wohlstand,	  München:	  Riemann	  Verlag.	  Translated	  in	  French	  :	  Monnaies	  Régionales	  :	  de	  nouvelles	  voies	  vers	  une	  prospérité	  durable,	  Paris:	  Editions	  Charles	  Léopold	  Mayer,	  2008.Polanyi	  Karl	  (1957),	  "The	  Economy	  as	  Instituted	  Process",	  in:	  Conrad	  Arensberg,	  Karl	  Polanyi	  and	  Harry	  W.	  Pearson	  (Eds.),	  Trade	  and	  Market	  in	  the	  Early	  Empires.	  Economies	  in	  History	  and	  Theory,	  New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  pp.	  243-­‐270.
IJ
C
C
R
  C
la
ss
ify
in
g 
“C
C
s”
